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To the Editor – In a recent Letter, Adams et al1 argue that claims regarding climate-conflict links are 
overstated because of sampling bias. However, this conclusion rests on logical fallacies and conceptual 
misunderstanding. There is some sampling bias, but it does not have the claimed effect. 
Suggesting that a more representative literature would generate a lower estimate of climate-
conflict links is a case of begging the question. It only make sense if one already accepts the conclusion 
that the links are overstated. Otherwise it is possible that more representative cases might lead to 
stronger estimates. In fact, correcting sampling bias generally does tend to increase effect estimates2,3. 
The authors’ claim that the literature’s disproportionate focus on Africa undermines sustainable 
development and climate adaptation rests on the same fallacy. What if the climate-conflict links are as 
strong as people think? It is far from obvious that acting as if they were not would somehow enhance 
development and adaptation. The authors offer no reasoning to support such a claim, and the notion 
that security and development are best addressed in concert is consistent with much political theory 
and practice4,5,6. 
Conceptually, the authors apply a curious kind of “piling on” perspective in which each new 
paper somehow ratchets up the consensus view of a country’s climate-conflict links, without regard to 
methods or findings. Consider the papers cited as examples of how selecting cases on the conflict 
variable exaggerates the link. Each uses a case selection strategy rooted in the qualitative methods 
literature7. One, using a form of “crucial” case study, finds no evidence of climate impacts on land use 
conflicts in Mali, a region where climate-conflict links were especially likely to be found8. The other, 
using a “structured, focused comparison,” investigates two regions in the Middle East with similar 
climate stress but different conflict outcomes and concludes that climate’s role as a conflict driver has 
been exaggerated9. It is hard to see how these papers mislead people into thinking climate-conflict links 
are stronger than they really are.  
Knowing that case selection is biased is useful, but not a reason to lower our estimate of 
climate’s impact on conflict. 
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